How Vulnerable? by Inotai, András
A ghost is on the loose in the world. The ghost of protectionism. The 
bottle was opened by the Trump administration but can rapidly attain glob-
al dimensions with irreparable harm not only to world trade but also to the 
global economic and political landscape with serious security implications.1
The consequences of trade protectionism, following the 1929-33 global 
crisis, are well known. Politicians did learn this lesson at times when they 
did not react to the global financial and economic crisis in 2008 with wide-
spread and national/regional protectionism. They did understand that any 
breakdown in terms of high-level interdependence would lead to unpredict-
able consequences. International trade, although it suffered a double-digit 
recession in one year, was therefore able to remain a key pillar of stabilization 
and recovery.2 In the European Union, GDP decline by 4.5 per cent in 2008 
was accompanied by an 18 percent fall in trade. Trade returned, however, to 
the pre-crisis level as early as 2010, several years before the EU average GDP 
reached this stage. 
Moreover, ten years of continuous growth, a rare case in modern 
economic history, was largely driven by rapidly increasing and deepening 
economic interdependence both on the level of member countries and in 
the framework of rapid spreading and qualitative upgrading of global value 
chains. Global economic trends can hardly therefore explain why protection-
ism is once again with us, just at the peak of the economic growth cycle and 
preceding expected slowdown. 
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The negative impact of a protectionist policy
It was the Trump administration that, based on the “America first” view of 
the world, decided to initiate a frontal attack on international trade in gen-
eral and against “evil countries” with a huge surplus in bilateral trade with 
the United States (mainly China and the EU with Germany in particular). 
As a first step, tariffs of 25 and 10 per cent were introduced for steel and alu-
minum products, first against China and some other countries, and with a 
small delay, as of June 2018, also in trade with the European Union, Canada 
and Mexico. This policy was followed and reached serious dimensions by 
the introduction of punitive tariffs on 1,333 Chinese products with a value 
of about USD 60bn. Without any delay, China retaliated with a list of more 
than 100 products imported from the USA worth approximately USD 50bn. 
Escalation of the trade war, impacting the transatlantic economy, cannot 
be excluded either. 
The USA is starting to feel the negative impact of the protectionist pol-
icy. First, higher import prices or even higher prices of import substitutions 
by domestic production had the greatest impact on lower income groups and 
the relative or absolute losers of globalization, both decisive supporters of the 
Trump electoral campaign. 
Second, several commodities, facing higher tariffs and other restric-
tions, have been produced by US companies settled in various countries 
offering lower production costs. Thus, US companies can also be identified 
among the losers. Third, Chinese retaliatory countermeasures have already 
caused substantial loss to US farmers and generated a USD 12bn subsidy 
package negatively affecting the already shaky US budget. Last but not least, 
trade protectionism diverted attention from a much more serious problem, 
namely the rapid increase in Chinese interest and investments in, and many 
times illegal access to, American and European high-tech achievements.
Export-based economies
The economic structure and longer-term development of the new member 
countries of the EU are characterized by two basic features: a decisive share 
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of exports in GDP and high-level dependence on intra-EU trade. Therefore, 
at least in principle, exposure to external shocks could be mitigated by high 
involvement in the intra-EU trade environment.3
EU-28 exports revealed a continuously growing share in EU-28 GDP 
over the last decade. Although the export/GDP share of 39 per cent in 2008 
fell to less than 35 % as a result of the financial crisis, it bounced back in 2010 
and, in the following years reported a constant rise up to 45.8 per cent in 2017. 
In other words, the international involvement of the EU has been steadily 
growing, both due to rapidly growing exports to extra-EU emerging markets 
and to the long recovery and growth period within the EU and the Eurozone. 
Although almost all member countries, except for Finland and Swe-
den, followed the overall path of growing export-orientation, a basic driver 
of overall economic growth, differences in the GDP-related weight of ex-
port-orientation remained very strong. NMS countries excel by the highest 
export-orientation even in a global ranking. With the exception of the special 
cases of Luxembourg and Malta, Ireland leads this list with 120 percent of 
export/GDP ratio, followed by Slovakia (96%), Hungary (90%), Slovenia 
(82%), and the Czech Republic (79%). Even the less developed and previous-
ly less export-oriented new member countries register a higher than EU-av-
erage export/GDP ratio (Bulgaria 66%, Croatia 51%), with only Romania 
remaining below the EU average (41%). 
In contrast, the export-exposure of all large EU member states (France, 
Italy, Spain, United Kingdom) remains in the range of 30-34 per cent, with 
the exception of leading and highly export-oriented Germany with 47%, a 
bit over the EU-28 average. 
A strong link to the intra-EU markets
Interestingly, and in contrast to the older and larger member states, growing 
export-orientedness mainly resulted from a strong link to the intra-EU mar-
kets. This development is in sharp contrast to the overall EU figures that in-
dicate a manifest opening towards third markets. Over one decade, the share 
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of intra-EU exports in total exports of the EU-28 fell from more than two-
thirds to about 62 per cent. The above average growth of extra-EU orientation 
can be explained by several factors, including the discovery of rapidly grow-
ing extra-EU emerging markets, dynamic commodity sectors, sustained 
competitiveness but also “export-pressure” imposed on certain member 
countries in recession in order to keep production (and employment) levels 
up and turn to expanding external markets at times of intra-EU recession or 
sluggish growth. 
The dynamics of export-orientation to intra- and extra-EU markets 
deserves some additional remarks. First, the crisis initiated a quick (even 
if partial) reorientation of exports in several member countries, without 
questioning the key role of intra-EU markets (with the exception of the 
United Kingdom and Cyprus). In less than one decade, however, the share 
of extra-EU exports grew by 3 to 4 percentage points for Germany, France, 
Italy, Spain (and by 7 percentage points for the United Kingdom). Although 
to a smaller extent, also some smaller and highly export-sensitive old mem-
ber countries, such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal or even 
Greece followed this trend. 
The development of exports from the new member countries followed 
a different trend. Between 2009 and 2017, the share of intra-EU trade not 
only remained dominant, but also stagnant, in some cases even with increas-
ing intra-EU share, despite the already very high intra-EU levels (Bulgaria 
and Romania due to the accession impact of 2007, but also for Hungary). 
This development took place despite sometimes government-led export-re-
orientation initiatives. 
The importance of the US market
Due to their key intra-EU orientation, the NMS-7 only amount to 6.9 per 
cent of total extra-EU exports (with 5.2 per cent for the V-4). More than 28 
per cent are accounted for by Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, 
Italy and France, each slightly above 10 per cent. The NMS-7 share is even 
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smaller if we consider extra-EU exports to the United States (4.1%, within 
it V-4 with 3.5%) or to China (4.5 and 3.5%, respectively). 
Much more important is their presence in exports to Russia, with 
17.7% (V-4 with 14.6 per cent) of total EU exports to Russia. Looking at ex-
ports to the United States, Germany is most involved with 30 per cent of total 
EU exports, followed by the United Kingdom (14 %), Italy (11 %) and France 
(9 %). Apart from Poland (1.5 %) none of the NMS-7 reaches 1 per cent of the 
EU exports to the USA. 
The combined share of the USA, China and Russia in total extra-EU 
exports of the NMS-7 is similar to the EU average (33.7%, but including a very 
high 45 % share for Slovakia), but with a different geographic distribution. 
While the old and larger EU countries reveal a clear preference for the US 
market (above 20 % for the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy), the same 
indicator for the new member countries is about 13 per cent for Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, and much less than 10 per cent for Romania, 
Slovenia and Bulgaria.
The only exception is Slovakia with 19.3 per cent of its total extra-EU 
exports directed to the USA. As a consequence, the direct impact of any 
current or potential protectionist decisions by the Trump administration 
would be much more limited for the NMS-7 than for most of the other and 
stronger EU member countries. The figures are even more telling if we take 
into account the share of US-related exports in total exports of the individual 
countries. It accounts for 2.5 per cent for the V-4, as compared to 13 % for the 
United Kingdom, 9 % for Germany and Italy, or more than 7 % for France.
It should be added that the NMS-7, although all with a trade surplus 
with the USA, have a cumulative surplus of about Euro 5bn, or slightly more 
than 4 per cent of the total EU surplus of Euro 119bn. If the Trump adminis-
tration wants to target high US bilateral trade deficits, it could easily find Ger-
many (66 bn, or more than half of the total EU surplus), Italy (25 bn) or Ireland 
(18 bn). Another issue is that trade restrictions, once introduced, would be 
against the EU and not against separate member countries, even if commod-
ity-related punitive measures could easily change the overall distribution of 
the impacts and consequences.
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Potential direct and indirect impacts 
of growing US (and global) protectionism
Due to their unique openness, based on the limited size of the domestic mar-
ket as well as in-depth participation in the international division of labor as a 
major source of sustainable development, catching-up, competitiveness and 
higher living standard, the NMS are obviously more vulnerable to any ad-
verse development in international relations (both in security, political, fi-
nancial and economic terms) than most of the other EU member countries. 
Their direct exposure to US trade protectionism is also limited. The indirect 
impacts cannot, however, be ignored. 
First, any trade protectionist measure to be introduced by the Unit-
ed States in the future against the EU, would seriously affect the position 
of the NMS-7 in global and European value chains in general, and, in the 
automotive industry, in particular. Any restriction or higher tariffs on cars 
exported by Germany would have an almost immediate negative impact on 
Central European subsidiaries, generating a substantial part of the exports 
of these countries.
Second, the global and transatlantic spillover of US protectionism, 
followed by adequate countermeasures by the EU, may have unpredictable 
and incalculable consequences on the world economy. Such a situation could 
cause a significant disruption in trade and economic relations between the 
NMS-7 (and even more the V-4) and their key export partner, Germany. 
Trade protectionism may lead to “competitive devaluation”
Third, foreign direct investments, a key pillar of “competitive globalization” 
would suffer twofold. On the one hand, already existing networks might be 
destroyed, while, on the other hand, general insecurity would hold back com-
panies from establishing new subsidiaries and supplier chains abroad.
Fourth, the financial implications would have to be addressed. Contin-
uing trade protectionism would cause enormous damage to the international 
financial system and could lead to “competitive devaluation” with unfore-
seeable consequences. 
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by the United States in the future against the EU, 
would seriously affect the position of the NMS-7 
in global and European value chains in general.
77
Fifth, beyond retaliatory instruments, the EU, as an export-orient-
ed integration, may be forced to find new markets in order to alleviate the 
losses caused by US trade policy steps. One cannot rule out the possibility 
that several countries punished by US protectionism would be ready to mu-
tually open up their markets to each others’ products (including services 
and investments). This would generate additional extra-EU trade flows, in 
which the NMS, at least based on their current performance, are unlikely 
to be full-fledged participants. Opening up of such new channels could be 
used through European transnational companies, further fostering intra-EU 
exports which will be reexported by the host countries of these companies.
Sixth, the real threat of US trade protectionism continues to divert 
attention from the lasting negative impact of (recently prolonged) EU-level 
(and largely also by US-driven) sanctions imposed on Russia after the occu-
pation of Crimea in 2015. NMS-7 exports to Russia are as important as those 
to the USA (about 14 per cent of extra-EU and 2.5 per cent of total exports). 
Finally, several NMS countries consider potential trade restrictions in 
relation with the USA less a priority than some other issues. As an example, 
for Poland (and probably also for Romania), the stability of NATO and its 
commitment to offering efficient military protection against potential Rus-
sian initiatives or concrete moves is a dominant pillar of future Polish-US 
relations. Recent developments also seem to indicate that the US adminis-
tration has been changing its previous attitude towards the Orbán regime in 
Hungary. Non-trade and non-economic priorities seem to be more relevant, 
sometimes for external security reasons, sometimes only for the domestic 
“stability” of an authoritarian regime.
Continuing trade protectionism would cause
enormous damage to the international financial 
system and could lead to “competitive devaluation” 
with unforeseeable consequences. 
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